


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THE NEXT  
WAR

T. R. Parker

L I B R A R Y



PRESENTED BY  
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# THE NEXT WAR



# THE NEXT WAR

THREE ADDRESSES DELIVERED AT A  
SYMPOSIUM AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY

NOVEMBER 18, 1924

BY

NORRIS F. HALL  
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.  
MANLEY O. HUDSON

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# SCIENCE IN WAR

By NORRIS F. HALL, PH. D.

*Instructor in Chemistry at Harvard University*



## Science in War

THE subject of the rôle which science will play in future wars is one on which it is easy to talk an enormous amount of foolishness. It ought to be approached only by a man who has exceptional military staff training and ability. He should be experienced moreover in all modern forms of actual combat, be intimately acquainted with all branches of science and technology, and be a first rate clairvoyant.

If, therefore, half of what I say seems to military men foolish, or impertinent, and the rest unacceptable to scientific investigators, I shall not be too greatly surprised or humiliated on that account.

There are several cheap and easy ways of thinking about this subject that we

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ought to avoid if possible. The first is a naive form of "wish-fulfillment" which runs something like this: "We peaceful folk are the dupes of great capitalists, *entrepreneurs*, diplomats, and generals. They start the wars and we finish them. In the next war these miscreants will all be blown to bits or gassed in the first twenty-four hours." The answer, of course, is that they won't. The picture is too "beautiful" to be true. Men who are capable enough to dominate the rest of us in time of peace will for the most part find means of protecting themselves in war.

Another unconvincing view is that of irresponsible, non-technical, speculative idealists like ourselves. Unwilling as we are to undergo the mental hardship necessary to understand the military art, we delight to seize upon some facile dream such as the all-destroying gas, the deadly

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bacterium, or the death-dealing "ray," which we can all understand, without learning ballistics, aeronautics, or machine design, and suppose that this will at once wipe the slate clean of the traditional soldier with his tactics and trajectories, and drill "by the numbers."

A third fallacy is complementary to this. It is the fallacy of the vested interest. It is the view held by the unreflective military man that, in spite of the changes in the world wrought by science and industry, his problem is still essentially the same as it was in his youth. He thinks that because there have always been infantry, there always must be infantry; that because tanks and gas are new-fangled, heterodox, and sometimes ineffective, their day is over and that the next war will be won by small-arms marksmanship, cavalry charges, and bayonet work. This

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view is typified by the characteristic remark heard at the time of the armistice: "Thank God, now we can get back to real soldiering!"

I shall try to avoid ethical considerations and subjective bias. My plan will be to consider briefly the future possibilities of some of the war devices we know today, and to try to trace their possible development and interaction in a not too distant future.

First of all it must be realized that, as the imposition of some policy is always the ostensible object of war, and war would never be fought if all our potential enemies were always willing to accede to our wishes without argument or opposition, the primary object of war may be said to be psychological, that is, the leading of the adversary to adopt some particular state of mind. Today, in order to secure this result we find it necessary to destroy a large part of his



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property, annihilate his armed forces, and wear down the resistance of his population by famine and disease. This may not always be necessary. If through the labors of earnest technicians, *lying* can be brought to such a pitch of perfection as actually to deceive the enemy, we may find that the traditional methods will become completely obsolete. And the same thing is true of suggestion. It may some day prove possible to attack the will of a people in some subtle and rapid way through the sense organs of sight or sound so as to make them acquiesce docilely in a political plan they would otherwise indignantly reject. Let us, however, leave these fantasies for the present, and examine the usual material means of seeking a "decision."

One of the chief essentials of war is mobility, and we see that today movement is possible through water and air, as

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well as over the surfaces of land and sea.

Of these types of movement, the freest, the most rapid, the newest — in a word the type most suited to war — is motion through the air. Air travel uses two devices, the dirigible balloon and the airplane.

Taking the less promising first, we see that the critical feature of a dirigible is the gas that keeps it up. Now, if there is one scientific prediction that can be confidently made, it is that no other gases than hydrogen and helium will ever be discovered that can be considered for airship use. Helium is only  $25/27$  as buoyant as hydrogen, costs many times as much to prepare, and is extremely rare, but it will not burn or explode, and this quality is of absolutely overwhelming importance in these days of flame-throwers and incendiary ammunition. It is of course possible that substances can be found to mix with hydrogen in small

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proportions which, without destroying its buoyancy, will make it inert toward the oxygen of the air. This is only a remote possibility, however. The virtual monopoly of helium in the United States and Canada at present gives these countries at least a temporary advantage in this respect.

The utmost decrease in the weight of the frame of the dirigible that can ever be hoped from the use of different materials is about four-fifths of the present weight, so that the only other way to increase the lifting power is to increase the size. How far this can profitably be carried is uncertain, but it is easy to foresee the possibility of airships which could circumnavigate the globe, or carry a hundred tons and upwards for thousands of miles. Compared to the airplane the airship must always be slow, low-flying, conspicuous, easily attacked, and expensive. Nevertheless, until the air-

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plane learns to hover indefinitely without expending too much energy, and until its carrying power can be vastly increased, dirigibles will have a minor usefulness as bombers or transports. They may perhaps be employed as refilling stations for armored airplanes, which, because of the weight of their protection, must cut down their stores of fuel and with this their cruising radius. These dirigible aerodromes, hanging high in the heavens, would be relatively immune from attackers on the surface and would themselves perhaps be replenished from large supply submarines.

When we turn to the airplane we find the weapon which now seems certain to draw first blood in the next war. Next to the projectile itself, it is the fastest material vehicle. Useful in peace as well as in war, and possessing a great surprise value, it is certain to be the first arm used at the

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outbreak of hostilities between any two nations not too distant to reach each other by this means.

The functions of an airplane, besides intelligence, liaison work, and similar minor duties, are combat with other airplanes, attack of objectives on the ground, and transport.

Let us make some very conservative assumptions about aircraft.<sup>1</sup> Let us assume that some warring nation has enough fighting planes to secure, for the most part, command of the air, and in addition one or more fleets of heavy planes for bombing or transport. A fleet may contain say two hundred machines. The effective radius of action of such a fleet may be taken as 250 miles, and the lifting power per plane as twenty fully equipped infantrymen or two tons of bombs or supplies. All of these

<sup>1</sup> "Aeroplanes in Future Warfare." Capt. McA. Hogg, M.C. Royal Engineers. *The Army Quarterly* IX, 98 (1924).

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figures have already been surpassed in particular cases.

Allowing 75 per cent efficiency in bombing, such a fleet would be able to unload on its objectives 300 tons of bombs a day for several days. What would this mean? In the first place, what would be the objectives? It seems clear that these would not be in the first instance fortresses, military camps, or depots,—first because troop concentration might not yet have proceeded very far, and second because such military strongholds would enjoy a maximum of direct and indirect protection. Instead, the bombers would launch their attack against railway centers, plants capable of producing large quantities of munitions, and in general at crowded industrial or governmental districts where the destruction and disorganization caused by the attack would be a maximum.

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It seems to me that city water supplies would be cut off by broken connections, if possible, at the same time that light and power stations would be blotted out and fires started with incendiary bombs. Government buildings would be natural targets, and movement would be hindered as much as possible by the blowing up of bridges, tunnels, etc. The situation which would ensue would be pretty bad and might result in a paralysis of government and of production. If one considers in addition the possibility of partly poisoning such water supplies as one could not cut off, the possibilities of the method are seen to be increased and the attractions of metropolitan life somewhat diminished.

If for any reason it were desired to secure even greater disorganization, while at the same time large scale property destruction and loss of life were avoided, this could be

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accomplished by the use of gas. Even 200 tons a day of many of the gases now available would paralyze completely all industrial life in a large city, and the gas could be chosen so as to cause a perfectly insignificant loss of life while making the city uninhabitable, or the streets could be piled high with dead without causing more than a trace of actual property damage. The best technique today probably demands the simultaneous use of H. E., smoke, and gas, in such an attack.

It may be said that such an inhuman method of war will never be resorted to. In the first place, it may be remarked that cruelty is not at present *inhuman*, or uncommon, but on the contrary thoroughly human and fashionable so long as it can be practised at some slight distance from the victim. In the second place, it should be pointed out that the progress of technology



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has for the first time made these attacks *feasible* at the very moment when the interlocking of industries, the mechanization of war, and the increased dependence of armies on their home industrial organizations have given such attacks a greatly increased military importance.

The other possible use of airplanes would be in transport. The last war was the first in which there were no flanks to be turned. The battle front extended over the entire distance from the mountains to the sea, and so became indestructible. It could be pushed back in places, perforated for short distances, but could not be, or at least never was, rolled up. The result was position warfare, with all that term implies of the indefinite prolongation of war's agony. In the next war, because of the perfection of air transport, armies will have a third flank. The possibility will always be pres-

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ent of landing an armed force through the air at some point directly on the enemy's line of communication. A little computation will show that such a fleet of planes as I have suggested could transport a brigade a day, for several days, and then keep the resulting two or three divisions supplied as long as they could defend themselves on the ground, provided command of the air were not lost.

The question of defense at once rises to our lips. I suppose no one will dispute the statement that the best defense is to keep far out of the path of war, if that is possible. The next best is clearly to have command of the air yourself. Other forms of defense are unsatisfactory. The only adequate answer to an airplane is another airplane.

It is a practical impossibility to move all the important parts of the industrial

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mechanism of a great city far enough underground to be out of reach of airplane bombs, though much can be done in this direction, if necessary. Anti-aircraft artillery is, and I believe always will be, ineffective.

Against gas, the only thoroughly effective way to protect a city that occurs to me is to cover every square foot of its streets, squares, and roofs with small fires, say jets of burning illuminating gas. These would effectually disperse any war gas after the entire surface had been maintained at a good high temperature, say the boiling point of water, for an hour or two. Meanwhile the inhabitants could retire into gas-proof cellars and do cross-word puzzles. This does not seem a very practical plan! Another fairly effective method against some gases would be to sprinkle the surface of the city thinly but thoroughly with some material, like chloride of lime, that

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would attack them chemically. There is no question that this would cut down casualties. In a long war the civil population could perhaps be trained to wear gas-proof clothing and gas masks. But it would be absolutely impossible to guard against an *initial* attack by these means.

Having now "given the civilian population a taste of war," let us see what the real soldiers will be doing.

How will the land army of the future look as compared to an army of today? It seems probable that we are witnessing another transformation in the conception of military mobility such as marked the introduction of the railroad. But, while the railways mainly affected strategical mobility, the new departure will be in tactical mobility. After the rail-head is left behind, armies today must perforce progress slowly and *one-dimensionally* along

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such existing roads as may be available. The motor truck and armored car have made a beginning, it is true, of increasing the speed of movements, but this process will be vastly hastened when the perfection of the caterpillar tractor permits the free use of the second dimension — wholesale cross-country movement at high speed. This development will not come at once, and the details are of strictly military interest, but the final goal seems to be an army consisting almost exclusively of airplanes and tanks, mostly tanks.

In several ways the tank seems the logical converging point of many features of land warfare. Take the infantry. The effectiveness of the infantry depends on its weapons, and the apotheosis of infantry weapons is the machine gun. Automatic and rapid-firing, it is ideal for covering and defense. Its chief disadvantage is its lack

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of mobility. This disadvantage, together with the infantryman's constitutional lack of protection, forces the machine gunner completely to immobilize himself in a concrete pillbox or a trench where he is likely to be drenched with gas, burnt out with thermite, blinded with smoke, and squashed like a louse under the tread of an advancing tank.

Let him once get into the tank and his troubles are over. His mobile mounting is now also a shield, which can be made proof against all projectiles smaller than a one-pounder at least. His air can be filtered against gas and smoke, his speed gives him a fair chance even against field guns using direct laying, and if he can once get near them he can mow down the gunners and then flatten the gun into the mud.

Consider the light field artillery. In a fixed emplacement the guns or crews are

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exposed to destruction by counter battery work with high explosive, shrapnel, and gas, and to loss or capture if the enemy makes a little advance. To deceive hostile observers and to attain new targets, they must continually pack up and trek to a new position, plowing slowly and painfully through the mud, behind unreliable horses that may at any minute be put out of business by a shell, a bullet, or an attack of "temperament." They can, of course, use tractors, but how much better to mount the guns and protect the crews by means of a tank, adding machine guns or sharp-shooters for auxiliary weapons!

Consider the cavalry. What is a charge of light tanks but a cavalry charge translated from a dead language into a modern tongue? And what chance has cavalry against tanks or artillery today? Except for occasional dispatch riding, liaison, etc.,

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the place for the horse in war is at home, in a park or a riding academy; and the place for his rider is inside a tank.

The engineers of the future, themselves riding in tanks, will probably be chiefly charged with satisfying the very modest demands of the tank for a passable terrain and with keeping the tank army in good mechanical condition. Thus the conditions of land warfare will more and more closely approach conditions of sea warfare as two-dimensional mobility increases. And much of the romance of life on the ocean wave may be claimed by the tank fighter of the future. The first ground battles of the war will be tank battles, battles of machines snorting and bellowing in seas of smoke and gas. After one side has gained tank supremacy, his hosts will career about his enemy's country, destroying and terrorizing, until they themselves are destroyed by



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land mines or artillery, or are captured for lack of fuel and ammunition.

The further possibility that the tank of the future may be amphibious has been frequently suggested, and we may find new uses for the well-known Marine Corps either in the under-seagoing tank which can cross seas beneath the surface, crawl up the beach, and set out merrily across country, or in the large tank-carrying submarine, which, lying at night off a favorable shore, may disgorge a whole swarm of artillery and infantry tanks.

Of course such tanks as these are far in the future, but even today we hear of a twenty-ton tank, mounting a light cannon and several machine guns, which is capable of making as high as twenty-five miles an hour over average terrain. It may be, of course, that these considerations chiefly apply to small actions involving

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not more than one or two army corps. In the very largest scale operations, infantry would almost certainly reappear, — and tanks be perhaps chiefly used for artillery and transport, and as a covering weapon.

To come back to the laboratory, whence we are continually lured by the pleasures of the battlefield, what actual improvements in war materials can be expected as the result of research?

The range and effectiveness of artillery of all calibers can probably be considerably increased by improved steels and other alloys. The use of successive explosions of improved propellants and very high angle fire may make it possible to shell Coblenz from Paris, or Boston from New York, but it seems doubtful if dispersion can be controlled sufficiently to make that a very useful procedure. High explosives can probably be made somewhat "higher," but, as

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long as they depend on a chemical reaction, the total energy of explosions cannot be much increased, and it seems doubtful if their violence can be radically intensified.

Shrapnel can be made perhaps a little more thorough in its action by the use of explosive and poisoned bullets, in case it should seem desirable to try to make every casualty a death, and the same possibility of course applies to machine guns and small arms ammunition in general. Whether any more concentrated form of energy than high explosives can be applied to destructive purposes is an interesting question. A source of such more concentrated energy appears possibly to exist in the disintegration or building up of the atoms of the elements themselves, but we seem still very far from controlling it on a practical scale.

On the medical side, the control of infectious disease, wound infection, and pain,

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may well become nearly absolute, but dismemberment by shell-fire will long continue to be an unpopular experience. The strength, agility, courage, and ferocity of individual men may perhaps be greatly augmented by selective breeding and judicious drugging. In fact, even the problem of increasing the intelligence of staff officers in the higher ranks seems not altogether hopeless.

These questions are all chemical, but the most spectacular side of chemical warfare is, of course, the use of gas and smoke. Public knowledge of gas warfare is so limited and frequently so inaccurate that, if I had time, I should like to describe its present status at some length. Gases used in war are all transported to the field as liquids or solids, and then are either vaporized by the release of pressure from a cylinder, atomized by the burst of a bomb

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or shell, sprinkled from airplanes or tanks, or set adrift by heat.

They are classified according to the effect they produce on the body. Some are merely tear gases, causing weeping and temporary blindness; and some are used to produce sneezing, vomiting, headache, and minor symptoms; some are vesicant, causing blisters to form over the skin of the entire body; others are definitely toxic or even lethal. Death may be caused by suffocation from a spasmodic contraction of the throat, from congestion of the lungs, or by absorption of poison into the blood stream through the lungs.

From a military point of view a gas is either deadly, or else merely harassing — good to impair the enemy's efficiency, but not likely to cause many deaths. It is important also to know whether a gas is persistent or non-persistent, whether it will

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render an area covered with it untenable for days, or whether it will blow away in a short time, so that one's own troops can advance easily over a recently gassed area.

Another important question of gas tactics is whether a given gas is effective in small amounts, or whether a great deal must be used. If it turns out that a persistent gas, capable of producing serious harassing effects in a concentration of one part in one hundred million parts of air, is available, it may often pay to use it instead of a non-persistent lethal gas that must be expended in quantities one hundred times as great in order to be effective.

For most purposes the ideal gas would be vesicant, persistent, lethal, efficient, and cheap, and should be difficult to protect against. This represents a modest ideal compared to the newspaper stories of new gases about to be used during the Great War,

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and has been surpassed, for all I know, in the fighting and research which have taken place since that War came to an end.

Here we touch the most important feature of chemical warfare, which gives it a surprise value like that of airplanes — the practical impossibility of effective chemical disarmament. The munitions industry is a war-time industry. It requires plants which can easily be inspected. If you are making a sixteen-inch gun or a tank, you cannot persuade an inspector or a spy that your product is a drain pipe or a houseboat. But you may be carrying out a research to discover a new gas, and even the other chemist at the next bench can hardly be sure you are not making some harmless dye or perfume. Once planned, the manufacturing process can be developed in separate steps, scattered through a large chemical manufacturing plant in such a way that

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the very division superintendents may not know what it is they are working on. Finally, the finished product can be stored in ordinary looking containers, marked "naphthalene" or "Bismarck Brown," and trickled out through a variety of agents, to be again secretly concentrated at strategic points to await the outbreak of war.

The more efficient, well-organized, and powerful is the chemical industry of a country, the more capable it is of suddenly turning out the enormous quantities of harmful products necessary for a first-class, up-to-date war. In case a thoroughly unified chemical industry is not available, another solution is possible. Great government arsenals can be built which can be used for large scale production of war gases. As these cannot successfully compete commercially in peace-times, this is always a wasteful plan. The existence in



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the Rhineland of the enormous chemical trust called the Interessen-Gemeinschaft, which controls the greatest facilities for the production of gases the world has ever seen, is what has been called in a recent book "The Riddle of the Rhine."

A sideline of gas-warfare is smoke, which may be used either to conceal a friend or blind an enemy, may be made colored for signaling, mixed with gas to conceal or simulate a gas attack, or may be made poisonous and penetrating to turn the enemy's mask into a mere useless encumbrance. Smoke and thermite, which is a spray of white-hot molten iron, proved the best medicine for machine gun nests in the last War, next to running a tank over them.

What can be hoped in the future in the way of improvements in gas warfare? One thing may confidently be expected. The relative importance of gas will greatly

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increase. Because of its cheapness, because of its surprise value, because of its peculiarly varied and interesting tactics, we may expect it to be used on a scale that will make the gas warfare of 1917 and 1918 look like child's-play. If position warfare is ever resumed, it is not difficult to foresee such wholesale inundations of gas as will make a twenty-five mile strip of country totally and permanently impassable except to men in gas-proof tanks or wearing complete outfits of gas clothing and masks.

What this will mean in reduction of fighting efficiency everyone can understand. For the peculiarity of gas is this: Against civilians or low grade troops it may be instantly, murderously, and completely effective. The same in a somewhat less degree may be true against the best of troops, provided some element of surprise is involved — some new gas, for instance, against

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which the mask or clothing fails to protect. Once used against highly trained troops, a given gas rapidly loses its terrors as their skill in protection increases, but every increase in protection involves a loss in efficiency — difficulty of breathing, sluggishness of movement, dimming of vision.

In his more inspired moments the gas officer dreams of other ways of afflicting the human body or paralyzing the brain. General paralysis can now be produced by very small injections of certain anaesthetics. Balance is said to be maintained through the movement of certain hairs in the fluid which fills the semi-circular canals behind the ears. Might this mechanism somehow be deranged so as to cause a sudden loss of all muscular coördination? These as yet are merely dreams. We see no method of attacking the problem. The eyes, the respiratory system, the digestion, and the

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skin seem at present the only physiological avenues of approach to the brain. Whether lethal bacteria or protozoa can be enrolled as auxiliary troops seems very uncertain.

Let us not accept too uncritically our first involuntary reaction of loathing to such methods of war. Is not much of our feeling due to the novelty of the method rather than to its actual effects? In the Great War, as subsequent statistics have shown, a man who was gassed had twelve times as good a chance of complete recovery as a man wounded by shrapnel or high explosive. Men who have suffered both will testify that gassing is almost always less painful than wounds. Moreover, the possibility is always present that a gas may be found of such properties that it can secure complete victory without killing or maiming, which is totally impossible with other weapons of war.

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Let us briefly now consider methods of defense, the other side of the picture. Here it is probable that save for the total avoidance of war the one good means of defense will be in the future, as in the past, the counter-offensive. It is better to sink the enemy's fleet before he shells your coast; it is better to shoot down his airplane as it rises from the ground than to wait until it gasses your city; it is better to attack his tank from another tank than on foot; it is better to break up his supply system than to wait until he cripples your own; it is better to fight the war on his countryside than on yours. This is the hopeless, fatal, abominable logic of war, inevitable if war is once accepted as a method.

There are, of course, secondary methods of defense. Getting underground and living on filtered air are excellent practice when

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the airplanes start dropping bombs and gas, and some day we may see all munitions plants, all army camps, all airplane hangars constructed underground, and the war planes will come roaring up their tunnels and take the air at full speed, like a nest of infuriated bumblebees.

The land for miles around these valuable points may be sown thick with mines of gas and high explosive to shatter the tanks as they come charging across country, and great dry moats may also be used to check their advance.

Aerial "watch-dogs" will fight off approaching planes, and anti-aircraft artillery will contribute its share to the defense. If it seems desirable, the entire country can be clouded with smoke to make bombing uncertain, and it may prove useful to bring about rainstorms or high-voltage electrical discharges for warlike purposes.

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It seems to me that from this brief survey two widely different conclusions may be drawn. On the one hand, a new world war may be decided by some quick and overpowering blow, embodying a new application of some scientific discovery, before the war has gotten well under way, so to speak. Here secret preparation and training, the organization of industry and research are the *sine qua non*. In this case, however vast the destruction, however "inhuman" the methods used, however appalling the sacrifice of life, such a solution might well be preferable to its alternative,—a long war to be decided by a statistical preponderance of resources. This would mean a war with stabilized fronts,—a war of mud, vermin, disease and nameless agony,—a war of starvation, exhaustion, lying, brutalization, and madness.





THE CONSCRIPTION OF  
PUBLIC OPINION

*By* ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.

*Professor of Law in the Harvard Law School*



## The Conscription of Public Opinion

THE previous speaker has dealt with the use of poison gases in the next war. We have now to consider a more insidious influence which operates upon the mind and not the body and which is intended to stupefy not our enemies like gas, but ourselves.

The use of propaganda begins long before any declaration of war. Modern advertising methods have shown the possibilities of highly organized endeavors to influence thought through reiterated suggestion. It is a magnification of the experience of the little girl who went alone to a toy shop to purchase a doll and returned with a particularly unattractive specimen. When

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asked by her mother whether she wanted that doll, she replied, "I thought I didn't when I first saw her, but the man behind the counter showed me that I did want her."

It is not difficult to create in the people of a nation a favorable attitude toward a prospective war. The attitude of "my country, right or wrong" is instinctive in most of us and is developed by the natural tendency of the school books in each country to regard all wars undertaken by that country as righteous. It is obvious that the English and French school books cannot both be right about the Napoleonic Wars, but this dilemma does not worry the school child in either country.

When adult years are reached, this instinctive patriotism is easily quickened by excitement and organization. Military training camps become schools for preparedness, and are advertised by the post-

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office stamps on letters and by essay contests in which the prize is given by a high official or his wife. There is no similar official recognition for essays on disarmament. Instead, officials of the War Department aid in the distribution of an attack on our peace societies, and spread through the country a spider-web chart to show that all these societies emanate from Moscow and aim to disarm the country in order to make it an easy prey for revolution. There is no national disarmament day, but the War Department recently proclaimed a Mobilization Day, afterwards renamed Defense Day, which proved an admirable occasion for military propaganda by members of the Army and Navy, and which bids fair to become an annual event.

It is, of course, natural that members of our armed forces should wish the people to take an interest in their activities which

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are not fully appreciated in times of peace. They are members of a profession with a definite purpose and it is just as unreasonable to expect them to be averse to a war which would give them opportunities to put their long training into practice, as to expect a lawyer to object to the existence of courts where he can use his legal training. It would be absurd to blame military men or the members of any other profession for trying to promote the purposes of their particular group. But this tendency of professionalism always needs vigilant watching from outsiders lest it go too far.

Of course no people wants to enter an unjust war, but, unless it knows all the facts, almost any war can be made to appear just. The undesirable activities and qualities of other nations can be repeatedly emphasized. The questionable activities of one's own nation can be kept in the background.

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For example, very little attention has been paid by the press since 1915 to the occupation by armed American forces of Haiti. In so far as it has been mentioned, stress has been placed upon the previous disorder in that island, and not upon the fact that for the first century of the Haitian Republic its constitution forbade the ownership of land by foreigners, and that this prohibition has been removed under the pressure of American occupation so that large tracts have already passed to American owners. In the same way, at the outbreak of the war with Spain very few Americans knew that the Spanish Government had accepted our demands. Much of this ignorance is not due to deliberate suppression. That is not necessary. People are instinctively inclined to read and believe what is favorable to their country, and ignore the rest. Newspapers do not give prominence to un-

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favorable items because they know their readers will not be interested in them. Consequently, the decision of the Government to declare war is almost sure to meet popular approval.

This situation will continue indefinitely unless we take affirmative steps to alter it. Our natural hostility to foreigners just because they are different from ourselves ought to be actively combatted. Much of the space which is given in our press to the military preparations of other nations might better be devoted to interpreting to our people their art, science, higher ideals, and generous works. We should hear much less about the Japanese navy and more about Japanese color prints; more about French clarity of thought and educational methods, and less of Parisian immorality; more about the efforts of the Germans to establish their republic, and less of the



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foolish sayings of the survivors of the old order; more about the attempt of the Soviet Government to educate the masses of a country which in marked contrast to the rest of Europe was kept in ignorance and oppression during the nineteenth century, and less about its economic blunders.

In addition to the deliberate cultivation of international good will, we ought to face frankly the possible causes of more wars, like tariff walls and reckless investments in backward countries.

Finally, we must deliberately set ourselves to train the young to distrust what they are told in books and newspapers, to discount the nationalistic bias of others, and to eradicate it as far as possible from themselves. The evils of an unnecessary war are so indescribable, especially one of the probable magnitude of the next conflict, that we should omit no steps which

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may lead to a correct popular understanding of our relations to other countries. The real enemies of this nation are not those who speak unfavorably of some act of our government abroad, but those who would by suppression and falsification lead the people to approve a war which might be avoided.

After a war has begun, the effectiveness of propaganda is vastly increased. Indeed it may be that, just as it is said to have been helpful to stupefy soldiers who were about to go over the top with ether in order that they might fight better, in the same way a nation cannot conduct the modern type of war which enlists civilians as well as soldiers if minds are allowed to operate freely.

This, at any rate, is the position of the article on propaganda in the new edition of the "Encyclopedia Britannica" written

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on the basis of considerable experience in the British Military Intelligence Office. The writer frankly states that "indifference to truth is a characteristic of propaganda. Truth is valuable only so far as it is effective. If a decisive victory is possible, opportunism may be more useful than exactitude. The more the emotions are excited, the more the critical faculties are inhibited. High strung persons soon come to believe what they wish to be true." Of the British propaganda during the War, he says, "It had, therefore, the legitimate objects not only of concealing what it was useful to conceal, but of making suggestions which might deceive." And he observes, "The suspicions aroused by an admitted propaganda lessen its effectiveness, from which it follows that much of the work has to be furtive." The extent to which this agency of war was organized is ably set

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forth in this article. For instance, a German Army order captured in East Africa showed contempt or ignorance of Mohammedan religious customs. It was reproduced in facsimile with a translation in every known tongue spoken by Mohammedans. Work of this sort was carried on by several bureaux, each with a large staff of writers and printers. All countries recognize the truth of Ludendorf's remark that wars are no longer won by armies in the field, but by the morale of the whole people.

On the one hand, the enemy is blackened by stories of the manufacture of fat out of corpses, cutting hands off children, and nationalizing women; on the other, one's own side is whitened and the war becomes a struggle against an iron ring of encircling enemies. During "the War to end war" anyone who prophesied that tonight we should be engaged in a discussion of the

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next war would certainly have been disbelieved by his hearers and, if he had been vituperative in his remarks, he would probably have landed in prison.

We find similar attitudes in all wars, no matter how questionable their justification. Early in the Crimean War, an English speaker declared of the Sultan, "It would be no dishonor to Englishmen if they were to rank him with the Alfreds and Edwards"; while another speaker described Turkey as "among the most enlightened of European nations, if enlightenment meant high moral principles." Palmerston declared, "The object of the present war is the establishment of the peace and security of Europe on a solid and permanent foundation."

Such propaganda is readily believed because of the hysterical condition of those who read it, apprehensive of every sort of

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danger. John Lord O'Brian, assistant to the Attorney General in the late War, tells some of the false stories of enemy activities within the United States. "A phantom ship sailed into our harbors with gold from the Bolsheviki with which to corrupt the country; another phantom ship was found carrying ammunition from one of our harbors to Germany; submarine captains landed on our coasts, went to the theatre, and spread influenza germs; a new species of pigeon, thought to be German, was shot in Michigan; mysterious aeroplane floated over Kansas at night." An important German spy, landed on our coasts by a submarine to disperse large funds and caught spying in our camps, turned out to be a plumber from Baltimore. Spies caught on beaches signaling to submarines were subsequently released as honest men. One of them had been changing an incandescent

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light bulb in his hotel room. "There was no community in the country so small that it did not produce a complaint because of failure to intern or execute at least one German spy."

There is no reason to suppose that there will be less propaganda or less hysteria in another war, and, as in the past War, most men will refuse to discuss the merits of the methods and objects of the war, but will consider that a useless distraction from the fundamental purpose, "win the war."

All this warping of thought and curtailment of discussion can be largely accomplished without punitive measures on the part of the Government. Most men of their own wills will devote themselves entirely to victory. We might call it the enlistment of thought. But some men will refuse to devote their speech and writing to the cause of victory, and for these force will be

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necessary — the conscription of thought.

Before the late War, such suppression would generally have been supposed impossible. The tradition of open discussion was still strong among us. At the head of the Bill of Rights in our Constitution stood the words, "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." This prohibition made no exception of war. As a United States judge put it, "The framers of the First Amendment knew that the right to criticize might weaken the support of the Government in time of war. They appreciated the value of a united public opinion at such a time. They were men who had experienced all those things in the War of the Revolution, and yet they knew too that the republic which they were founding could not live unless the right of free speech, of freedom of the press, was maintained at such a time.



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They balanced these considerations and then wrote the First Amendment."

We can no longer cherish the delusion that this provision of the Constitution protects open discussion of the merits and methods of a war. We can predict with certainty what will happen in the next war from what happened in the last War, because exactly the same statute is in force. The Espionage Act, passed in June, 1917, does not seem, on its face, to make such discussion criminal. It punishes with imprisonment for not more than twenty years three offences: First, false reports or statements intended to interfere with military operations or promote enemy success; second, causing or attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the armed forces; third, obstructing the recruiting or enlistment service. Yet the interpretation of this statute by the

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courts gave it a wide application, and these decisions will be followed in the next war.

Thus, the first offence, which seems to mean wilfully untrue statements of facts on the adequacy of war preparation or the sufficiency of food, or false reports of military operations, was used to punish expressions of opinion about the origin of the War — for instance, that we went in because Mr. Morgan's loans to the Allies would be repudiated if they were defeated. The Supreme Court said that the speaker must have known this to be false because everyone knew that we went to War for different reasons. It will be equally dangerous to express unorthodox views on the causes of the next war.

The other two clauses would seem to apply to persons who urge evasion of the draft or refusal to enlist. But almost all the convictions were for expressions of opinion

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about the merits and conduct of the War. It became criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead of bond issues, to say that the sinking of armed merchant vessels was legal, to urge that a referendum should have preceded our declaration of war, to say that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ.

Men have been punished for criticizing the Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A., while under the Minnesota State law it was held a crime to discourage women from knitting by the remark, "No soldier ever sees those socks." A moving-picture producer was sentenced to ten years in prison for a film about the American Revolution which depicted British soldiers disguised as Indians, bayonetting women and children in the Wyoming massacre. Because, the Judge said, it might "make us a little bit slack in our loyalty to Great Britain." Mr. Griffith's film, "America," produced with

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the help of soldiers lent by the Government, shows British soldiers disguised as Indians bayonetting women and children in the Wyoming massacre.

There is no reason to suppose that similar speeches and writings and pictures will not be punished in the next war. It will be in no way necessary that these expressions of opinion should be addressed to soldiers or men at the point of enlisting or being drafted. The decisions hold it enough if the words may conceivably reach such men. It will be impossible to express opposition to the next war in a newspaper of general circulation because it will be read in some training camp where it might cause insubordination. A speaker will be unable to address a large audience because it is liable to include a few men in uniform ; he may be punishable if it contains men of military age who might eventually be called to fight ;

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some judges have emphasized the possible presence of shipbuilders and munition makers. All genuine discussion among civilians of the justice and wisdom of continuing the next war will thus become perilous.

Another clause of this statute enables the postoffice officials to exclude from the mails any newspapers which they consider disloyal, and all sorts of absurd decisions were made in the last War which will undoubtedly be repeated in the next. State laws of much greater severity than the Federal statute are still enforced and will undoubtedly be used if the Federal officials are disposed to allow open discussion.

The first reflection that may be made on these measures is their futility to prevent real harm. Men are imprisoned, but their words spread the wider for that fact. The mere publication in a newspaper of the statement of a leading radical — "I am for

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the people, and the Government is for the profiteers" — was considered so dangerous to the morale of soldiers who might read it that she was sentenced to ten years in prison, and yet her words were repeated by every important newspaper in the country during the trial.

The needlessness of such laws is shown by the experience of Massachusetts. We had in this State a large training camp and naval bases. Thousands of soldiers embarked from Boston for France. We had innumerable factories for the manufacture of munitions and other war supplies. We had in our midst a large foreign-born population, much of it unfriendly, by race at least, to the Allied cause, much of it possessing radical views. The United States District Attorney in Massachusetts refused to institute a single prosecution although much was said and written which would

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have been punished elsewhere. No record exists of a single bomb explosion, act of sabotage, or evasion of the draft, or desertion, which may be traced to such an unpunished utterance. There is not one bit of evidence that the cause of the War suffered in this State because of the adherence to liberal principles of this District Attorney, who has since been honored by elevation to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.

The second reflection is that such measures are harmful, during the war and after the war. They are harmful during the war because they prevent the formation of a sound public opinion on war methods and aims. The punishment of men for advocating heavier taxes instead of bond issues made it easier to finance the War by a method which produced a vast inflation of prices. The punishment by twenty-year sentences of discussion of the legality of our

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invasion of Russia without any declaration of war against that country checked consideration of a policy which has never been explained, which killed hundreds of Americans without any tangible gain, and alienated a nation which might have given valuable support to our peace aims in Paris.

Still more serious was the effect upon the discussion of War aims. Legal proceedings prove that an opponent makes the best cross-examiner. It is a disastrous mistake to limit criticism to those who favor the war. Men bitterly hostile to it may point out evils in its management, like the secret treaties which supporters of the War, like Mr. Wilson, were too busy to discover. If a free canvassing of the aims of the next war by its opponents is crushed by the menace of long imprisonment, such evils, even though made public in one or two newspapers, may not come to the attention of



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those who had power to counteract them until too late. The history of the last War shows how the objects of a war may change completely during its progress, and it is well that those objects should be steadily formulated under the influence of open discussion not only by those who demand a military victory, but by pacifists who take a different view of the national welfare. Insistence on an artificial unanimity of opinion behind the war produces a sluggishness of thought which is bound to result in unsatisfactory terms of the treaty of peace.

In our efforts to silence those who advocated peace without victory we prevented at the start that vigorous threshing out of fundamentals which might in the end have saved us from victory without peace.

The real value of freedom of speech is not to the minority that wants to talk, but to

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the majority that does not want to listen.

Wartime suppression is bound to have a bad effect after the war. Lincoln remarked in support of such measures that man could not contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life. The truth is that persecution of unpopular doctrines is not an emetic at all, but a drug. A nation which indulges in an orgy of intolerance will continue after the cessation of hostilities to suppress those whose opinions are distasteful. Intolerance produces an uncritical public opinion and intense satisfaction with one's own views. I sometimes wonder whether Roosevelt would so eagerly have urged our entry into the War if he could have foreseen the tremendous setback that it would give to the liberalism which he had so much at heart. The natural aftermath of

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our wartime freedom from thought includes the British election of 1918, our selfish indifference to world organizations for peace, even the World Court, our readiness to accept the most extraordinary arguments, such as the objection to the Child Labor Amendment that it was a Bolshevik measure, whereas it naturally continues the Child Labor Bill which was introduced by that well known radical, the late Senator Lodge. After the next war, critical thinking in this country will be practically impossible.

The natural conclusion from these observations is that such methods of waging a war should be rejected, and the expression of opinion on its aims and methods should be practically free except where they produce a clear and present danger of actual interference with military operations. Nevertheless, I consider it practi-

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cally certain that in the next war, which will probably be a more far-reaching conflict than the last, propaganda and suppression will be used even more extensively.

The tradition of free speech in war-time has been shattered. The Supreme Court has shown that it will give no protection to it. The officials will find ample precedents at hand for censorship and prosecutions. Once the war begins, any attempt to have its aims defined in public opinion, except as the Government wishes, any attempt to argue that the time has arrived for it to cease, will be perilous indeed. Therefore, those of us who value the preservation of an intelligent public opinion in this country must bend our every effort to the end that there shall be no next war.

# THE STACKING OF THE CARDS

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## The Stacking of the Cards

**I**T was a favorite theme with Thomas Jefferson that "the earth belongs always to the living generation." He thought that every judgment and every act of man should be subject to revision at the end of nineteen years; for that was the period he selected as the time within which a majority of the adults living at any one moment would be dead. In consequence, he found it impossible ever to look into the future for more than nineteen years.

We who have been whirling through the changes wrought in world society and in human affairs during the past two decades should be more modest. He would be a bold person who, after following the development of international politics during

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the last ten years, would dare to make even a tentative prediction as to what may happen during the next nineteen months. The chemist can feel more secure; the cumulation of science may enable him to know today a great part of what the chemists will know some decades hence. Mr. Hall is therefore on solider ground in this discussion. Even in the field of social behavior, perhaps we have some clear basis for prediction to enable Mr. Chafee to be more definite. But in politics, bed-fellows change so frequently and currents turn so rapidly that the present always seems a chasm which separates the future from the past.

I think we must therefore refrain from making any confident predictions as to the line-up of peoples in the next war. If there were such a thing as history's repeating itself, perhaps we should have to say that in the next war the best-armed states would



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be the first to engage. Perhaps we should have to say that the United States would probably be fighting on the side of Germany, just as Britain was allied with her former enemy, France, in the last War. But I think we cannot be safe in any prediction that history will repeat itself. We cannot know even the part of the world in which the next war will be waged. How much less may we foresee the issues which may be at stake or the countries which may be involved.

Turning through the index of the *New York Times* for the past three years, I find repeated predictions that a great war is brewing. Now it is in Europe, now it is in South America, now it is in Asia. But all of these predictions seem to me untrustworthy. Most of them are efforts to achieve premature fulfillment of some wish with reference to more or less isolated factors.

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The traveller who returns from Europe, resenting the new boundaries of Poland or Hungary or Roumania, sees war as the only agency for correcting them; he usually seeks a logical solution of some complicated problem, ignoring the extent to which time as an emollient factor transgresses logic in its achievements. A student of the recent Santiago Conference, excited by the unpopularity of the United States in South America, leaps easily to the conclusion that war is inevitable between the Anglo-Saxon peoples in North America and the Latin peoples to the south of us. An American who has just read "The Rising Tide of Color," and who happens to have had contact with Japanese who resent our Exclusion Act, readily concludes that war between the East and the West is inevitable; and once the idea has lodged itself in his mind, he can easily become obsessed with

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plans for the defense of the United States which would ignore five thousand miles of the Pacific Ocean.

In all of these predictions fashion plays the dominant rôle, and fashions are as easily sprung and spread in politics as in haberdashery. Only a few years ago it was fashionable in many circles in America to talk about imminent war with Japan. The fashion has gone today, and fewer people are worried on that score, although most of the reasons assigned when the fashion was in vogue still obtain.

All of this comes to saying that the next war is by no means inevitable. It will not come simply as a consequence of the passage of time, for the thoughts of men are no more narrowed than widened by the mere process of the suns. It has been one of the contributions of the modern scientific method that we are gradually building a

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great limbo of discarded inevitables. Few there are now who think it a vain ambition of the human race that all virulent diseases should be cast into that limbo. Tuberculosis, typhoid, last year diabetes, this year diphtheria — all of these plagues have been thrown out of the category of providential visitations. Similarly, it is no longer a tolerable thesis that wars will happen at intervals, regardless of what men may do. If the next war comes, it is not going to come in spite of men's efforts, it is going to come because of them. It is not going to be a divine dispensation, it is going to be a product of human manufacture. It will not be sent by God to cleanse men's souls. It will not even be consciously planned by man to relieve the world of any surplus population. I think it is a safe forecast that the next war, if it comes, will be a clear blunder, a clear result of flounder. The

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human race will stumble into the next war, though of course, as in the past, all sorts of apocryphal reasons will be invented to explain the hazard on which it trips.

If this be true, then, it would seem clear that one of the best safeguards against the next war will be our appreciation in advance of how we shall lead ourselves into it, of how we shall wade through it, and of how we shall drag ourselves out of it. And this, it seems to me, is the justification of our discussion tonight. I know there are people who think we should not talk about the next war because merely talking about it is likely to weaken the will to peace which may prevent its coming. But for my part, I would prefer to have the people who would avoid the next war entertain the will to peace because of a carefully-wrought understanding of what the next war will mean. Within the limitations which I have

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set on our indulging in prediction, some speculation would seem permissible, built upon observations of human methods and human motives which remain more or less constant in experience.

On this reasoning we are not so much concerned whether the next war is to be fought around the Atlantic or around the Pacific, in Europe, in South America, in Asia, or in Africa. Rather are we concerned with the ways in which people will approach the brink of reason, the leap they will take over its edge, and the struggle they will go through to pull themselves up again. In other words, I think we may safely direct our attention to an inquiry as to how the cards will be stacked before we go into the next war, how they will be shuffled while we are in it, and how we may expect them to be dealt out again after the war is over.

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We are speaking of a world war and not merely of one of those so-called private wars in which relatively few people are involved. We have rather prided ourselves since 1917 by calling the War which began in 1914 a "World War." In fact that was never quite true; for, during the entire period, six important European countries remained neutral in the sense that they refused to take definite sides. Only five South American countries were engaged out of ten, and none of them contributed in any decisive manner to the prosecution of the War. Almost throughout the period from 1914 to 1918 either Russia or the United States was inactive. Yet the last War was perhaps as nearly a world war as we shall ever see in the future, and it did put the whole world into what Professor Shotwell has called a state of siege. With so many peoples involved, it was natural that we

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should think of the various Allies as empowered to legislate for the world of the future.

Our consideration of the next war as thus defined may very well differ from our consideration of a possible war, for example, between Greece and Bulgaria, or between Guatemala and Honduras, or even between China and Japan. In each of these cases general interest might be, and probably would be, involved. Each of them might create a situation which would strain existing international law. Since 1919, fifty-five nations have agreed that any war or any threat of war shall be a matter of concern to all of the fifty-five. But in spite of the breach of the world's peace that any private war involves, the wars which I have mentioned would be chiefly local in their effects. One can imagine that even a war involving all six of the Central American countries



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would little affect currents of thought and action in Europe and in Asia, and this would be true even though it should engage the United States. Nor would this fact of local effect be changed by any world legislation making war a crime. On the assumption that by "world war" we mean a conflict involving so many states that it would deserve that name, how is it likely to come about, by what method will it be conducted, and what will determine its probable issue?

Such a struggle will probably be preceded by a pretty thorough discussion which will give us more light on its causes than we had in 1914. For a decade prior to the last War we were constantly being warned of danger. From Algeciras to Agadir, a whole procession of events now seems to have announced the conflict. But there was no continuous discussion on which public interest centered; there was no organi-

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zation in the world for coöperative deliberation; there was no forum in which searchlights could be turned on the forces which were active. The world lacked, in other words, a means of knowing itself, and it lacked in consequence the means for understanding what it was doing. The scramble for Africa, the formation of ententes, the vacillations of national rivalries — all went on, but the actors moved behind the scenes. War was threatened and averted many times.

When the situation became acute in 1914, the world had no machinery, it had no tradition to bring the statesmen together to face the storm in a coöperative endeavor to preserve the peace. Sir Edward Grey worked in advance for a conference, and since that time we have frequently been told by British statesmen that, if a conference had been held, the War would have

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been averted. Mr. Lloyd George, who bore a share of the responsibility, has made that statement quite recently.

Now that the War is over, we are engaged in a serious effort to discover what its causes actually were. We know now that the peoples of different countries held different views as to what the causes were while the War was on. In England and in America we talked about the Germans' having begun the War. But in Germany people talked about the Russians' having begun the War. Not only were the causes differently understood by people fighting on opposite sides, but they were differently understood also by people fighting on the same side. France and Siam, Serbia and Uruguay were hardly more of one mind than France and Germany. Nor were the different people in any one country agreed. President Wilson and leaders in the Senate

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probably never saw America's part in the War in the same terms. Even those of us who in 1917 and 1918 were clear in our minds as to what the War was about have now begun to wonder. And I think it is safe to predict that we shall grope for the causes during many years to come.

In a recent article in the *Independent*, Mr. Robert Lansing, a former Secretary of State of the United States, seems to regard it a normal thing that "history yet to be written" should "determine which party was in the wrong" in every struggle. Premier MacDonald, in a speech before the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 4, 1924, said that the ability to assess responsibility for aggression "belongs to the historian who studies and writes fifty years after a war and never to the politician who lives through the beginnings of a war." But who can imagine that peoples

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would willingly draw themselves into a war for causes which could only be determined by "history yet to be written"? Some of the peoples who fought in the last War had little opportunity to know what it was all about before the War began, and many of the peoples engaged, for instance the Moroccans and the Annamites, probably had slight opportunity to know before the War was ended. Little satisfaction will they take in the battle of the historians which now begins to rage.

Now I think we may hope that the next war will be preceded by a long series of discussions conducted on a coöperative basis, for the world has now what it lacked in 1914, a machinery for conference and consultation. Fifty-five nations maintain today a machinery which they call the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations. For fifty-five peoples conference is fast be-

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coming a habit and a tradition. In fact, viewing the progress which was made in the two decades prior to 1914, the world would seem to have gone a whole century forward since the last War ended.

In twenty years of effort prior to 1914, we succeeded in getting two Peace Conferences assembled at The Hague. When the delegates of twenty-five nations came together in 1899, we thought that the world had turned a corner. When after two and one-half years of effort we succeeded in getting a second Conference assembled in 1907, with the delegates of forty-four States present, our American opinion was confident that a new era had been launched in the conduct of international affairs. From 1907 down to 1914 the most we dared to hope for was the assembling of a third Hague Conference. Not that anyone expected war to be outlawed at such a Con-

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ference; not that anyone expected the nations to agree that all their disputes would be settled by peaceful means; not that anyone expected that machinery would be set up for conference when differences might become acute; but we pinned our hopes on the system of the Hague Conferences because they meant the establishment of the principle of continuity in consultation.

Since the War, however, we have achieved an advance which exceeds the wildest dreams that any of us entertained prior to 1914. Each year in the last five years we have succeeded in bringing together at Geneva the representatives of more nations than attended either of the Peace Conferences at The Hague. A machinery has now been established so ramifying in influence and so embedded in affairs that it is difficult for any of us to

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see how the world will ever be satisfied again without it.

Now, it seems probable that this machinery will have a big influence if the world should ever again turn its face toward Armageddon. The conflict will probably be preceded by long-drawn-out discussion; the record of the discussions will form an open book which can be read throughout the world; and the details of the dispute will flame in the headlines of every newspaper. The issues may not be made clear and they will doubtless be complicated and extensive. But if the present machinery can go on for a generation, if the Assembly of the League of Nations can continue to meet on the first Monday of every September, and if the Council of the League of Nations can continue to meet four times each year for a quarter of a century, I think there can be little doubt that a next



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war would come only after a long-developed series of international discussions. And, at any rate, the world will know more about its causes than was known about the causes of the last War.

A single instance in post-War history will illustrate my meaning. Let us compare for a moment the Serajevo crisis of 1914 and the Corfu crisis of 1923. There are many differences, and I do not want to strain the analogy; but the comparison may clarify my point that the existence of machinery for conference will greatly modify the way in which the world might approach another struggle. In 1914, the Austrian Arch-Duke was murdered in June. Five weeks of hurried and hurried negotiations failed to produce a conference of the Powers. Serbia's effort to appeal to a Hague tribunal came to naught. The cables with all their chances for misunderstanding and all their

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inability to reproduce atmosphere were the only resource at the Powers' command, and they were cut early in August. In 1923 the Italians occupied Corfu on Friday afternoon. The next day, on Saturday morning, the Greeks appealed to the Council of the League of Nations, and on that very same day Italian and Greek representatives were sitting around a table with the representatives of nine other countries, explaining their points of view and sensing the world's desire to avert a war.

Now if this process of conference precedes the next war, it is possible that hostilities will be undertaken only as an effort on the part of one state or one group of states to vindicate a position disapproved by the organized community of states. It may be a war like the war between the North and the South in this country from 1861 to 1865; it may be an attempt at

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secession by one state or one group of states from the world community; it may be an attempt by one state or one group of states to challenge the principles on which the general community is organized.

Some of us will doubtless say that the last War was such a struggle, for the Allies did profess to be acting on behalf of the organized opinion of mankind. But it is difficult to escape the fact that so many peoples of the world took a different view of the Allied Powers' mission, and there is plenty of evidence that people in Germany and Austria and Hungary and Bulgaria and Turkey took the same view of their own activities.

In every war the belligerents on both sides are tempted to universalize their cause. However dispassionately we may judge the consequences of taking different roads while we are still at their fork, all of

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us are disposed to assure ourselves, once we are committed to a choice, that there was never but one right road to be taken. We Americans thought of ourselves as the protectors of civilization when we sent our army to Cuba and our navy to the Philippines, but peoples in other countries no more shared that view than they thought of the British as the harbingers of civilization in the Boer War. If the United States had fought a war with Mexico in 1916, we should now explain it as a war necessary to the defense of civilization. On both sides in the last War men thought of themselves as fighting to vindicate interests common to all peoples.

One difficulty in the past has been that the world community had no machinery for giving to certain nations a mandate to protect world society. But in the future such an organization will exist in the League of

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Nations. With such machinery in the world, a claim by an unauthorized belligerent to act on behalf of world society will be entitled to no more consideration than a claim by the Ku Klux Klan to act on behalf of the people of Texas today.

This clarification of the causes of war, this puncturing of the assumptions to which belligerents are tempted, once their course of action has been decided upon, may not prevent the next war, just as the American Civil War was not prevented. Attempts at secession from the organized world-society will always be possible. If the secession succeeds, men will afterwards justify it; certainly, if the position taken by the South in 1861 were judged by the ideals avowed in 1918, much could be said for it though it failed. Even if open secession is not attempted, a next war may be fought in which one group will deny the authority

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of the society of nations, or in which both groups will profess to be acting on behalf of the League of Nations. Or, without a mandate, a state may profess to be vindicating a principle more important than the principle of organization. In any event, it would seem clear that no state in the next war will fail to avow its service to the common interest of all nations.

The cards will be stacked pretty effectively in favor of the side which makes good its claim to represent the world community. The other side will probably be branded as committing an international crime. Even if the Protocol which forty-eight states have recently drawn up at Geneva does not come into force, the opinion of the world may have worked out along some similar lines a method of outlawing war. The nation that goes to war without submitting to a peaceful procedure

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in advance will probably be dubbed an aggressor, and an attempt will be made to punish it as an outlaw.

The consequences of this formulation of opinion mobilized through international machinery will be very far-reaching. If one side in the next war succeeds in branding its enemy as criminal, then it will throw to the winds all limitations which might embarrass the effective use of military power. When society sends out a policeman to clean up a gang of crooks, it is not over-meticulous as to the method which he uses. The defense of society always seems so important that no interference will be brooked which would jeopardize its success. We saw in the last War that a state with its back to the wall will resort to any mode of warfare which its General Staff thinks would be effective. How much more will this be true if a

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state is acting with a clear mandate to protect organized world-society against an outlaw nation. That is why little is to be expected from such a treaty as that drawn up at Washington in 1922 concerning the use of submarines and gases — a treaty, by the way, which has never come into force.

I think this may explain the attitude which will probably be taken toward traditional international law if there is a next war. If the League of Nations continues its approaches to universality, and if one side is fighting on behalf of the League of Nations, there will be no room for neutrals in the next war. This was the forecast of President Wilson in the last War. If all the Powers should enter a war at the beginning, there would be no need for a law of neutrality. It was because the United States was not engaged in the War in 1914 that neutrality was then so important; but once



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we became involved, Mr. Frank Polk is reported in Page's "Life and Letters" to have said to Mr. Balfour: "It took Great Britain three years to reach a point where it was prepared to violate all the laws of blockade. You will find that it will take us only two months to become as great criminals as you are." If this quotation is inaccurate, it still reflects a sentiment then prevailing. In other words, the United States as a belligerent in 1918 threw aside the limitations we had insisted upon in 1915. Of course, international law will continue to include some rules for determining the legal effects of certain belligerent conduct. But if all nations and whole populations are mobilized, the limitations on action both against neutrals and against non-combatants will totally disappear.

Of course in the next war, as in past wars, each side will accuse the other of violating

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international law. I chanced to visit Hungary and Jugoslavia in 1920, and I found people in each country making the same accusations against the people in the other. We made ourselves believe during the War that the Germans had committed every offense known to international law, but many German jurists, whom we must admit to be capable and honest men, were convinced that the violations were chiefly on the side of the Allies. If any of the stories of the "water cure" administered by American forces in the Philippine Islands are true, the belligerent that conceives itself to be acting on behalf of civilization does not by that fact render itself immune from temptation. Recrimination is an inevitable product of war. I have heard a Justice of the United States Supreme Court quoted as saying that after his experience in the Civil War he resolved

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never to believe anything that a people may say about its enemy in time of war.

In the next war atrocities will play their usual rôle. People on each side will tell, and telling will believe, that the other side is guilty of the most awful cruelties. Each side will believe that the other attacked first — German liberals were sure in 1914 of the air attacks on Nuremberg. Each side will accuse the other of first using forbidden weapons. Each side will believe that it has found children with their hands cut off. What is worse, behind all this there will frequently be a small ounce of foundation for each ton of rumor. Who of us to-day regards the Germans as the super-monsters we believed them to be in time of war? Yet so difficult is it to learn from experience in these matters that I do not doubt that the next war would have its atrocity-mongers even if it came tomorrow.

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Now the results of this are not so bad in themselves. It is not that hate is building on lies. That will not be the worst thing in the next war. For hate usually manages to defeat itself and the losses fall most heavily on the haters. A far worse result is the consequent change of purpose and objective as the war progresses. Even if we assume clear objectives in the beginning, the progress of the struggle is certain to develop many changes. I was once struck with a remark of Gilbert Chesterton's that posting a letter and getting married were the only romantic things left in the world. He conceived the chief element of romance to be uncertainty, and he wrote before the War. He would now have to add as a third romantic experience, going to war. For once in, there is no telling what changes will occur in purpose and in aim.

Lytton Strachey has told us how General

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Gordon, "Chinese Gordon," as he was called, was sent to Khartoum in 1885 to plan for the evacuation of the Sudan. The purpose of his mission was first simply to make a report. As he travelled from London to Khartoum the purpose changed at each stage of the journey, until by the time he reached Khartoum the end of his mission was to "smash up the Mahdi"; and, as Lord Cromer tells us, in the end "he threw his instructions to the winds." A similar tale is told by the consecutive reports of the Secretary of the Navy with reference to the occupation of Haiti by the United States.

How often in our national experience have we taken a road only to find ourselves landed in the opposite direction. We went to war in 1898 to help the Cubans throw off the yoke of Spain, and within four years we were quelling an insurrection against our

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authority in the Philippines. In the last War, when President Wilson formulated his fourteen points, on January 8, 1918, every American was to be ready to die to achieve them. But who had conceived of such objectives before we entered the War? During 1916 and 1917 many Americans had been uncertain in their minds about Alsace-Lorraine. President Wilson's eighth point related to Alsace-Lorraine and made it one of our objectives in the War to "right that wrong."

The shuffling of the cards while the War is on has to be done not once, but many times. In 1917 the people of the United States had little quarrel with Austria-Hungary. In August, 1917, President Wilson told the Pope that "the dismemberment of empire" formed "no proper basis for a peace of any kind." In January, 1918, President Wilson wanted Austria-Hun-

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gary's "place among the nations safeguarded and assured." But by the end of 1918 we refused to treat for peace on any such terms, and in the end we took part in carving up that ancient empire by a process which some of us now like to call "Balkanization."

Objectives in war seldom remain constant to the end. Unless the next war should be fought as a strictly police undertaking by the organized community of nations, it will probably be no exception. However carefully we stack the cards, we may count on it that something will happen to necessitate another shuffle.

It is even more startling to see how the objectives entertained when war begins, and even their re-formulation while it is necessary to appeal to men to fight, are often ignored when peace is made. That is easy enough to understand in case of de-

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feat. But it is quite likely to occur in case of victory. The War of 1812 will illustrate my meaning. I suppose we should not say that the United States was defeated in that war. One of the chief questions that led us into it was that of the impressment of American seamen into the British service; but the peace treaty at the end of the war wholly failed to mention that question.

So during the War with Germany. In early 1917 many of my friends around Boston were talking about sea law and the freedom of the seas as a reason for our going to war. President Wilson in his second inaugural insisted that America demanded that the seas be free and safe "under rules set up by common agreement and consent." A year later the second of the fourteen points insisted on "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas." But the Treaty of Versailles does not so much as mention



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that subject, and who would have dreamed of putting it into the treaty we made with Germany in 1921?

Another incident will illustrate my point. While the various Allied Powers were falling into line in 1915, opinion was freely expressed in America that some of them were selling out to the highest bidder. We now know of secret treaties which afforded some basis for that view. But in 1918 it would have been "disloyalty to our Allies" to have referred to such possibility. In 1920 the American people were ready to abandon any attempt to protect our Allies in possessions which the victories of our armies enabled them to get. And when we made a separate peace with Germany in 1921, the phrase "loyalty to our Allies" had lost its spell.

One more illustration holds our attention today. Through the earlier part of the last

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War most thoughtful Americans were convinced that coöperative effort was needed to end the anarchy of 1914. We organized in the United States a "League to Enforce Peace." And in the course of a few months it enlisted wide support throughout the country. Scoffers there were, and of course they called the idea Utopian; but Senator Lodge answered them very effectively in a notable address advocating the League to Enforce Peace on May 26, 1916, by saying that "It is in the search for Utopias that great discoveries have been made." And he added "'Not failure, but low aim is the crime.'"

President Wilson came cautiously to the idea. But in asking Congress to declare war, he favored a "partnership of democratic nations." By January 8, 1918, he brought his fourteen points to a climax in a demand for a "general association of na-

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tions" formed "under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Throughout 1918 there was practically no dissent from that object of the War. But when we finally made peace with Germany in 1921, we carefully avoided any provision for a league of nations, and today we have little part in maintaining the League which for five years has functioned with such surprising success.

In the next war we may be sure in advance that the cards will have to be re-dealt when the fighting is over, and if we hold at the peace conference any of the same cards that we held when Congress declared war, we may count ourselves fortunate indeed. The peace will probably contain many things that we do not dream of when we go to war, and we may make

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up our minds to that risk before we start.

Let me summarize: The next war is by no means inevitable. It will not come in spite of what the human race does, but because of what it does. If the League of Nations does not prevent it, we shall at least have better warnings and clearer indications of the issues involved than we had in 1914. We may have a struggle between one group acting on the mandate of organized world-society and another group challenging such authority. In this event, the former group will be as free in its fighting the outlaw as a policeman is free in making his arrests. The law of neutrality will go by the board and whole populations will be combatants. During the struggle we may expect to see the cards shuffled many times, and at the end of it we shall be fortunate if we come out holding any of the cards that were in our hands when we went in.

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“The earth belongs always to the living generation.” What does our generation will about the next war? Shall we bring it on, or shall we stave it off during our nineteen years of power? Shall we hand on to the generation that will follow us a heritage of menacing policies and brooding hates, or shall we hand on to it a heritage of organized coöperation and growing good will?

For my part the answer does not depend on any grim foreboding that the next war will destroy civilization. If I thought that before 1914, the events of the last ten years have disillusioned me. Civilization has proved itself pretty tough, and it might withstand a still greater attack. The answer rather depends on the utter irrelevance of the next war to any of the things which I want to see brought about in human society. Even if I could see a relevance at cer-

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tain points, I should feel most certain that, if the cards were not stacked against my aspirations at the start, a shuffle during the war would take away all my trumps and in the dealing at the end my original hand would disappear entirely.

Our generation which saw the last War begin will soon have lived its nineteen years. Our members in America who lived through the tension of 1914, who fed on alleged atrocities in 1915, who went into the League to Enforce Peace in 1916, who rode to war on a high horse in 1917, and who saw the grim race through to victory in 1918, we shall have given up the reins. What shall we hand on to the generation which shall succeed us, of whom a majority will have had none of these experiences?

In fifty-five other countries members of our generation are engaged in a great experiment. They are trying earnestly and

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intelligently, even if sometimes they are making mistakes, to organize the world against the next war. Those of us who live in America have our responsibility too. Shall we live up to it? Or shall we help to bring on the next war?

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